Sukarno's Foreign Policy: The Question of West Papua

From 23 August to 2 November 1949, a roundtable conference was conducted in The Hague, participated by the delegations of the Netherlands, the Republic of Indonesia, and the Federal Consultative Assembly (BFO) under the assistance of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, which had ended with a final agreement. The agreement includes the unconditional and complete transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands over the entire territory of the former Dutch East Indies, except Western New Guinea, to the United States of Indonesia. The island of New Guinea was divided between the British government on the east and the Netherlands on the west, forming a part of the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch government found the ethnicity and culture of the island's population to be out of place from the Indonesians, therefore considering Indonesia to have no rightful claims over the territory. The conference ended with loose ends. With that, the status quo was maintained, putting the questioned territory under Netherlands' administration with the promise of further negotiation within a year after the transfer of sovereignty (Kahin, 1952). It was not until 1 May 1963 that the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority officially handed over West New Guinea to the Indonesian government and ended the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic (TNI, n.d.). This essay will argue that Sukarno's foreign policy, most notably in the case of the West New Guinea dispute, was mainly based on his interests in West New Guinea and the nature of his volatile Guided Democracy system.

To give some historical context, before Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the issue of West Irian and Indonesia's relation with the Netherlands was considered a matter of balance between Great Powers. It was excluded from the formal bounds of foreign policy. Indonesia maintained its neutrality in the Cold War very close to complex (Leifer, 1983). Vice-President Hatta even provided a statement to the American journal Foreign Affairs in 1953, in which he stated:

"Indonesia plays no favorites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the various international problems. It terms this policy 'independent' and further characterizes it by describing it as an independent and 'active'. By active is meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace, through endeavors supported if possible, by the majority of the members of the United Nations."

The independent and active foreign policy concept served to sustain domestic priorities to overcome economic, social, and administrative issues. It also served as a strict standard of conduct for governments to be judged upon. Intense competition among political parties with various views and constituents comprises foreign policy issues drawn toward the domestic process. Among others, the dispute over West Irian remained paramount, having a decisive impact on Indonesia's political system and foreign policy (Leifer, 1983).

The domestic population did not dispute Indonesia's claim over West Irian. Instead, it attracted broad support in proofing the Netherlands' approval over the legitimacy of the successor state. Furthermore, the incomplete transfer of sovereignty increases concern because the republic's territorial basis was based upon all of the Dutch East Indies' former territories. However, differing approaches to resolving the dispute made the matter of West Irian into an internal contention. The unanticipated economic and political opportunity costs of its assertive campaign to recover the least populated part of the archipelago dimmed too much risk for the early post-colonial Indonesian government. The conciliatory spirit remained held high during Hatta and his immediate successors, following the terms of the Round Table Conference. A discussion between the Netherlands and Indonesia was held in March 1950, which ended inconclusively. A ministerial meeting was conducted a month after the initial talks agreed on creating a joint commission to visit the territory, and they were expected to report by the end of the year. However, several occurrences of rebel attempts in the states and the abandonment of the federal system in favor of the unitarians led to a further divide in its resolution (Leifer, 1983).

The revocation of the provisional constitution in 1950 became the mark of the end of the parliamentary system and the closure of the Liberal Democracy era. Sukarno inaugurated the new Guided Democracy political system on 5 July 1959 (Leifer, 1983). Unofficially, Indonesian politics became dominantly ruled by Sukarno, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and the army, the three main actors. Past failures of the United Nations and the Western bloc in mediating the ongoing West Irian dispute over the years have contributed to the country's ever-growing anti-western sentiments. Indonesia's foreign policy became more militantly anti-colonialist and hostile toward the West (Suryadinata, 1996). The rise of this new political system is also viewed as inherently competitive and unstable over time. In the hope of sustaining the prevailing pattern of power, a disposition towards external initiatives serves as a common denominator of political feeling. The national revolution against the Dutch was seen as a sacred symbol for Indonesia's populous, and with the ongoing dispute over West Irian, the notion remained upheld even beyond independence. Such foreign policy issues evoked a nationalist response, subsequently giving Sukarno substantial freedom in political maneuvering without the danger of internal disagreements. In addition, the dispute over the territory was also seen to be based on resentment upon the fact that despite being the 5th most populated country in the world, with the possession of rich natural resources and extensive territory across a strategic region has not yet earned any form of respect from the Western world (Leifer, 1983).

Under the Guided Democracy system, Sukarno played a more hands-on approach to foreign policy, reflecting his temperament and frenetic nature of domestic politics through its rumbustious quality (Leifer, 1983). The national trinity between Sukarno, the army, and the PKI was most apparent during this period. While the military needed Sukarno's support as a form of legitimacy and the PKI needed Sukarno for political backing, Sukarno needed the two to counter-balance each other to gain political power. His failure to solve Indonesia's economic and political issues was compensated by his militant foreign policy of liberating West Irian, receiving full support from the army and the PKI (Suryadinata, 1996). This new militancy was first exposed in his speech at the General Assembly in 1960, in full attention of heads of government in attendance. In his speech, he exclaimed:

"Imperialism and colonialism and the continued forcible divisions of nations – I stress those words-is at the root of almost all international and threatening evil in this world of ours.

Sukarno implied through his speech that Indonesia's tolerance over the situation of West Irian had worn off and that the failings of the United Nations were a byproduct of the same Western system which had given way to Imperialism. He abandoned the conventional view of the Non-Alignment Movement as a third force and embraced the Cold War idea of bipartite structure. In his new interpretation, no possible coexistence can be formed between the two sides, as he reflected that the Cold War was a conflict between justice and injustice. Sukarno described this view through the world's divide between the New Emerging Forces and the Old Established Forces (Leifer, 1983).

Indonesia learned from its experience that gaining independence through proper engagement with great powers had resulted in political success. By diplomatic means, Indonesia could parade both the merits and justice of its cause internationally while also demonstrating the realization that its grounds would serve great powers' interests. Such a formula, together with several coercive elements that had not been available during the struggle for independence, will eventually be the very means of achieving mixed success in Indonesia's endeavor of disputes throughout the Guided Democracy period. As the conflict progresses, Sukarno has become more lenient towards the left, both within domestic politics and international alignment; this is mainly shown in his close ties with the People's Republic of China. Moreover, the continuous existence of a Dutch-controlled West Irian threatened the integrity of the socially diverse and distended archipelagic state. West Irian became a fundamental symbol of personal prestige, and Sukarno committed to recovering the territory in a limited time (Leifer, 1983).

Sukarno began to play his cards on both sides of the great powers in increasing his chances against the Dutch through his coercive diplomacy. While the US had shown generosity by providing light arms and aircraft parts supplies, Poland and Czechoslovakia had served a steady flow of heavy equipment, including aircraft and warships. The growing ties between Indonesia and the USSR also helped provision funds. In 1960, Nikita Khrushchev visited Indonesia with a credit of US$250 million in his baggage while also bestowing a fair amount of impact aid on hospital beds. The two countries' relationship grew ever more robust over the years, and a substantial amount of military assistance and purchases came with it. By the end of 1961, Indonesia had become the largest non-communist country recipient of military aid from the communist bloc and the largest recipient of economic credits after India and Egypt. Nevertheless, the Dutch government had not been impressed by the Indonesian efforts of coercive diplomacy. Despite both great powers within his pockets, Sukarno's time was of the essence as Dutch plans for self-government and increasing voices of anti-Indonesian Papuan nationalism grew visible (Leifer, 1983; Suryadinata, 1996; Kamalakaran, 2017).

By then, military confrontation has increasingly become inevitable. Nevertheless, diplomatic means were still taken into consideration. The Dutch proposal for trusteeship status for the territory reflected a growing sense of international isolation on their part and awareness of sustaining an expensive commitment to West New Guinea with the attendant prospect of armed conflict. On 19 December 1961, President Sukarno launched the Trikora (Three People's Command) and established an operational command led by Major General Soeharto, accompanied by increased sea and air West Irian infiltration. The confrontation concept was further introduced and implemented by Foreign Affairs Minister Subandrio, who promised its imposition on political, economic, and military fields (TNI, n.d.; Leifer, 1983). Although the threat of war was still far from Sukarno's ability to recourse it, his ability to create such a crisis condition made the US government feel obliged to resolve the dispute to Indonesia's advantage. In a way, Sukarno has decided to use Dutch attempts to set up an independent Papua to coerce the Americans to intervene in the dispute while also blackmailing their government over the prospect of domestic communist advance in Indonesia if the conflict is not to be resolved soon (Leifer, 1983).

By 1962, the Dutch and the Indonesian delegations decided to discuss the dispute in Washington. The Indonesian delegation found the US's support and responsibility necessary, emphasizing to the US government that their proposal to transfer the territory would be within the US's best interests. The talks were inconclusive and were resumed in July of the same year. An agreement made an indirect mode of transfer provision for some opinions of self-determination by the Papuan populous. The final accord was concluded on 15 August 1962 under the New York Agreement, giving Sukarno the official form of his undoubted victory over the West Irian dispute once and for all. The agreement's main feature was an initial transfer of administration to UN authority before finally being handed over to Indonesian control on 1 May 1963 (Leifer, 1983; TNI, n.d.).

Without a doubt, Sukarno's ability to use the Soviet's armed support was persuading the US to put their efforts into persuading the adamant Dutch government that had opposed the proposal of transferring the territory's government which had opposed the proposal of moving territory to Indonesia. The Americans have not been keen on another crisis spiraling into a world war. As Van den Hengel said it through Kamalakaran (2017):

"This was the death-knell for the Dutch rule over Western New Guinea. Besides wanting to avoid a direct conflict with the Soviet Union, the US did not want to look like it was supporting a European colonizer against a newly independent third world country."

The success of Indonesian independence gave Sukarno the proper tools to play his cards well, with both great powers securing Indonesia's national interest. However, the nature of Guided Democracy remained unchanged. With that, Sukarno is now obligated to continue in the endeavor of revolutionary romanticism to contain the existing centrifugal political forces within the foundation of Guided Democracy. A return to mundane political priorities will significantly undermine his dominance. Prolonging the revolutionary spirit will serve on the foundation of his inclination and his political purpose in sustaining the sense of drama and crisis, upholding a romantic revolutionary spirit that the majority of the population had embraced or would suffer the risks of political ex-communication (Leifer, 1983).

In conclusion, the dispute over West Irian was considered an essential conflict that must be solved in the eyes of the Indonesian populace. However, the proper action to resolve the situation has not reached a certain concession point. The rise of Sukarno after the transition from the federal to the unitary system has given him enough power as president to establish Indonesia's foreign policy according to his own will. The revocation of the provisional constitution of 1950, which ended the parliamentary system in exchange for the new Guided Democracy system, further increased the amount of political power and leverage in securing his policies without the fear of possible political rivalries. The notion proved accurate as Indonesia began to take a much more militant stance against the reluctant Western bloc and began to make closer ties with the USSR and their allies, something his prime ministers would have been hesitant to do under their non-aligned stance. The eastern bloc's generosity has brought the US into a dilemma, having no other way but to support the Indonesians in their claims against the Netherlands. Through diplomatic and military coercion, Indonesia gained a substantial victory in the end. However, the nature of the volatile Guided Democracy has forced Sukarno to prolong his foreign endeavors, searching for further external enemies in the hope of maintaining his unstable power base.

Bibliography

Kahin, G. M. (1952). Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Studies on Southeast Asia). Cornell University Press.

Kamalakaran, A. (2017, January 21). How Russia helped Indonesia annex Western New Guinea. Russia Beyond. https://www.rbth.com/international/2017/01/21/how-russia-helped-indonesia-annex-western-new-guinea_685151

Leifer, M. (1983). Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (1st ed.). The Royal Institute of international Affairs.

Suryadinata, L. (1996). Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership. Times Academic Press.

Tentara Nasional Indonesia. (n.d.). Monumen Trikora. Pusat Sejarah TNI.