Secrecy and the Pursuit for a World Without Nuclear Bombs

In 1946, a proposal was made by the United States to develop a comprehensive plan for international regulation of atomic energy. The Baruch Plan was introduced to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), which called for the control of atomic energy under an agency of the United Nations. Unfortunately, the negotiation broke down under great distrust from the USSR and ironically kicked off the nuclear arms race, which has lasted to this day (Gerber, 1982). The failure of the Baruch Plan shows one of the most significant issues in the effort of nuclear non-proliferation. The lack of guarantee and insurance of compliance tends to be an issue when it comes to disarmament. Even in the 21st century, where nuclear non-proliferation seems to have taken root in society, the issue of distrust and secrets remains in mind regarding the total eradication of nuclear weapons. This article will discuss secrecy as the greatest challenge in the effort toward total nuclear non-proliferation.

To give some perspective, Israel's history of nuclear weapons remains one of the most questionable stories in modern history. The existence of this information mainly relied upon limited US government documents and oral histories from those who had possessed the information surrounding the program itself. Survivability in a hostile neighborhood made the prospect of owning its nuclear arsenal preferable. However, the country remains to put an intense veil of secrecy surrounding its program, with no recognized nuclear tests ever conducted nor governmental acknowledgment of its nuclear capabilities, maintaining a strict disciplined policy of Amimut (i.e., the maintenance of secrecy through ambiguity and taboo) to this day (Bergmann & Peres, 2018).

Unlike most others, the tale of the North Korean nuclear program is a story of great drama. An economically impoverished, technologically backward, and diplomatically isolated state possesses a powerful and growingly competent nuclear weapon and missile development program. Such contradictions tend to create a shroud of secrecy, or rather, disbelieve, in the information. Despite all publications, it is the fact that North Korea remains one of the most mysterious countries in modern history with its highly monopolized information sources and limited freedom of movement, which makes the truth surrounding the nuclear arsenal to be questionable (Haggard & Cheung, 2020; Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).

From both cases, the concept of secrecy seems to have become part and parcel of the study of governments and the dominant stance of most nuclear powers. Access to government information is not a rare issue to be discussed, especially in political studies. Gibbs (1995) argues that such a tendency can be explained in three approaches. First, the external threat approach focuses on the assumption that state officials maintain state secrets in the hope of protecting national interests and security. The maintenance of secrets is meant to withhold information from possible foreign rivals. Under such an assumption, it is implied that governments will make no effort to hold secrets that their rivals have already known. They prefer to let go of documents once the detailed information is considered obsolete or harmless. The bureaucratic approach believes that the holding of information is caused by the intricacy and rigid operational procedures, resulting in possible irrational and unnecessary processes, thus making a more or less random classification of documents. Lastly, the internal threat approach believes that secrecy is maintained as a device to mislead the public and ensure elitist control over foreign policy. Another explanation from this approach is that secrecy is maintained to protect the interest, not of the state, but the governmental policy-makers. Therefore, secrets are made when the interest of bureaucrats conflicts with the interests of the public.

In conclusion, regardless of the particular reasoning and rationale behind one state's decision to keep information from the public's eyes, secrets will always be a part of the dynamics in the international system. With such factors identified, the need for guarantee and validation for a state's nuclear disarmament is ever more paramount in achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world (Erästö et al., 2019). When it comes to denuclearization, one may reminisce upon the case of South Africa, which is one of the earliest nuclear power to denuclearize. Nevertheless, copying the same protocol remains insufficient, especially when states remain adamant about keeping their nuclear arsenal or even those who would prefer it a secret (Maitre, 2020). With that said, it is crucial for those striving to propose the appropriate protocol for validation to consider the circumstances above to achieve effective and acceptable conduct of nuclear disarmament.

References

Bergmann, E., & Peres, S. (2018, August 15). Israeli Nuclear Program. Atomic Heritage Foundation. https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/israeli-nuclear-program.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2020). North Korean Nuclear Negotiations: A Brief History. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations.

Erästö, Tytti., Komžaitė, Ugnė., & Topychkanov, Petr. (2019). Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament Verification. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Gerber, L. (1982). The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War. Diplomatic History, 6(4), 69–96. https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim140110088

Gibbs, D. (1995). Secrecy and International Relations. Journal of Peace Research, 32(2), 213–228.

Haggard, S., & Cheung, T. M. (2020). North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs. Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

Maitre, E. (2020, September 8). The Challenges of Nuclear Disarmament Verification. FRS. https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/recherches-et-documents/challenges-nuclear-disarmament-verification-2020.